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sition.12 The principal case is the first direct decision in North Caro-
lina that this rule against excess duration of an indestructible private
trust operates to make a vested trust estate void. Heretofore, North
Carolina has declared that the Rule against Perpetuities as applied in this
state is the rule against remoteness of vesting,13 and that it is concerned
only with the vesting of estates, not with their enjoyment or possession. 14
The North Carolina court has frequently stated that the Rule against
Perpetuities does not apply to charitable trusts, and this is repeated in
the principal case. What is meant, however, is that a charitable trust
will not fail for excessive duration,15 because of the countervailing
public gain. For the rule against remoteness of vesting does apply to
charitable trusts, except where the property vests in one charity after
another charity.18 Indeed, in the principal case, the power of appoint-
ment that was concededly stricken by the rule against remoteness was
a power to leave the property to charity in the alternative.
ROBERT L. HINES.
Wrongful Death-Amendment of the Pleadings after the
Limitation Period Has Run
In a recent case' the plaintiff sued to recover for the wrongful death
of her husband, alleging that as he was driving along the highway in a
careful manner the defendant "negligently and carelessly" ran into him
from the rear and killed him. The defendant entered a demurrer ore
tenus at the trial, which was sustained on the ground that the complaint
did not state any fact constituting negligence. The plaintiff was granted
permission to amend. She then enumerated items of negligence, and
was awarded a judgment of $6550 on a jury verdict of negligence. On
appeal the North Carolina Supreme Court stated the rule that an amend-
ment which introduces a new cause of action will not relate back to the
" Pulitzer v. Livingston, 89 Me. 359, 36 Atl. 635 (1896); REsTATEDENT,
PROPERTY §378 (1944) ; RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS §62(k) (1935).1 Vinson v. Gardner, 185 N. C. 193, 116 S. E. 412 (1923); Springs v. Hopkins,
171 N. C. 486, 88 S. E. 774 (1916) ; O'Neal v. Borders, 170 N. C. 483, 87 S. E.
340 (1915).
14 Springs v. Hopkins, 171 N. C. 486, 88 S. E. 774 (1916); accord, Story v.
First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 155 Fla. 436, 156 So. 101 (1934); Hawkins v.
Ghent, 154 Md. 261, 140 Atl. 212 (1928) (where the four appointees, given life
estates in trust, were unborn at creation of power of appointment and estates were
held valid) ; Loring v. Blake, 98 Mass. 253 (1867). GRaY, op. cit. supra, note 3,
§121.5; 1 PERRY, op. cit. supra note 8, §383.
" Penick v. Bank of Wadesboro, 218 N. C. 686, 12 S. E. 2d 253 (1940) ; State
ex. rel. Wardens v. Gerard, 37 N. C. 210 (1842) ; N. C. GEN. STAT. §36-21 (1943) ;
2 BoGERT, op. cit. supra note 9, §352; 1 PERRY, op. cit. supra mote 8, §384; 3 Scorr,
op. cit. supra note 11, §365.
" Williams v. Williams, 215 N. C. 739, 3 S. E. 2d 334 (1939) ; 2 BoGER, op.
cit. supra note 9, §§ 342-349; GRaY, op. cit. supra note 3, §594; 3 WALSH, Op. cit.
supra note 3, §341; see Reynolds Foundation v. Trustees of Wake Forest College,
227 N. C. 500, 513, 42 S. E. 2d 910, 918 (1947).
'Webb v. Eggleston, 228 N. C. 574, 46 S. E. 2d 700 (1948).
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original complaint, and held that as the plaintiff's amended complaint
first stated a cause of action more than one year after her intestate's
death, thereby failing to meet the requirements of the Wrongful Death
Act,2 the judgment must be reversed. In a dissenting opinion Mr.
Justice Seawell took the position that the plaintiff had only defectively
stated a good cause of action and that the amendment should relate
back to the original complaint.
A recent Note in this LAW RI VEW3 discussed the question of
amendments which change the cause of action, and after demonstrating
the difficulties involved in determining the status an amendment will
be given, entered a plea for the adoption of the provision of the Federal
Rules4 for the relation back of amendments. Clearly under this rule
the instant case would have had a different result, for the negligence
alleged in general terms and that set forth in detail both arose out of
the same occurrence. 5 The difficulty is not in the rule that an amend-
ment stating a new or different cause of action will not relate back,
but rather in determining when to apply it.6 The North Carolind Su-
preme Court has declared the purpose of the one year limitation in the
Wrongful Death Act to be the giving of notice to the defendant so that
he can prepare himself, and this is done by the institution of the action.7
To construe the perfecting of a bad complaint as the statement of a
new cause of action is to unduly favor the wrongdoer, who has been
given notice of the claim against him.
The authorities advocate liberal application of the rule allowing the
amendment to relate back. Judge Charles E. Clark, in speaking of
allowing amendments to relate back in wrongful death actions, says:
"But now in all but a few jurisdictions the amendment is allowed if it
refers to the same general aggregate of operative facts upon which the
complaint was based."8  Professor McIntosh says the North Carolina
rule allows relation back when "the amendment is intended to perfect
2 N. C. GEN. STAT. §28-173 (1943) (".. . an action . . .to be brought within
one year after such death.").
* Note, Amendments Changing the Cause of Action-Limitations of Actions,
25 N. C. L. REv. 76 (1946).
" FED. R. Clv. P., 15 (c) ("Relation back of Amendments. Whenever the claim
or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction,
or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the
amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading.").
16 Am. JuR.., Death §289 ("... a petition alleging negligence in general terms
may be amended so as to set forth the facts, although the period of limitation for
the bringing of the action has expired when the amendment is made.").
TIFFANY, DEATH BY WRONGFUL Acr 187 (2d ed. 1913).
"See Trull v. Seaboard Airline Ry., 151 N. C. 545, 548, 66 S. E. 586, 587
(1909). Note, 4 Mo. L. Rav. 49 (1933) (a lea for the adoption of a notice-giving
test rather than the "cause of action" test for relation back of amendments because
of the present conflicting authorities).
8 CLARK, CODE PLEADING 729 (2d ed. 1947). Id. at 731 ("And unless there
has been so great a change in the material operative facts that an entirely different
fact situation is presented, the amendment should be allowed."). See also id. §118.
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the cause of action or defense which was imperfectly stated, or is ger-
mane to the original cause, deals with the same transaction, and does
not state a new cause of action." 9
In the principal case the court recognizes the unfortunate situation
in which the plaintiff finds himself. The careful defense counsel can
delay his test of the sufficiency of the pleadings at law until the trial,
and if the limitation period has intervened, it will thus be too late for
the plaintiff to avail himself of an amendment.' 0 He may elect to stand
on his complaint at the risk of being dismissed if the demurrer is sus-
tained." If he amends his complaint rather than taking an appeal on
the demurrer, he risks having the first demurrer called the law of the
case, as not having stated a cause of action, and subsequent amend-
ments would be barred as stating a new cause of action.12 But the
court feels bound by its previous decisions, and in similiar cases it is
unlikely that it will allow amendments to relate back where a complaint
first fails to state a cause of action.
Yet, North Carolina has respectable authority for an opposite re-
sult.13 In Lassiter v. Norfolk & C. R. R. the court allowed an amend-
ment to show the Virginia Death Statute after it had been denied by
the trial court as stating a new cause of action. Chief Justice Clark
said, "The rounding out of the complaint to cure a defective complaint
even in material matters is not changing a cause of action, nor adding
a new cause, but merely making a good cause out of that which was a
defective statement of the cause of action. . . . If the cause of action
were not defectively stated, there would be no need for amendment."' 4
The application and policy of North Carolina's "Saving Statute"'1
MCINTOSH, N. C. PRACMICE AND PROCEDURE §492 (1929). See also Notes,
30 Mice. L. REv. 795 (1932), 82 U. oF PA. L. REV. 657 (1934), 4 MERCER Bz-s-
LEY L. REv. 204 (1934), 171 A.L.R. 1087 (1947).
"Note, The Demurrer Ore Tenus, [1947] Wis. L. REv. 426.
"Ballinger v. Thomas 195 N. C. 517, 142 S. E. 761 (1928).
22 George v. Atlanta & C.A.L.R.R, 210 N. C. 58, 185 S. E. 431 (1936) (same
case earlier dismissed when defendant's demurrer sustained, 207 N. C. 457, 177
S. E. 324 (1934). The court said the first demurrer became the law of the case,
not to be questioned. Capps v. Atlantic C. L. Ry., 183 N. C. 181, 111 S. E. 533(1922) (first action brought under the Federal Employer's Liability Act; amend-
ment to bring it under the Virginia Wrongful Death Act denied. But see Chief
Justice Clark dissenting at 195, 111 S. E. at 540: "An action for a serious wrong
in a court of justice ought not to be denied upon metaphysical distinctions, or in-
genious discussions based upon a matching of wits between counsel.").
" Lassiter v. Norfolk & C. R. R., 136 N. C. 89, 48 S. E. 642 (1904) ; Renn v.
Seaboard A. L. R. R., 170 N. C. 128, 86 S. E. 964 (1915), aff'd, 241 U. S. 290(1916) ; Lefler Bros. v. Lane, 170 N. C. 181, 86 S. E. 1022 (1915).
14 136 N. C. 89, 92, 48 S. E. 642, 644 (1904). Walker concurring, id, at 96,
48 S. E. at 645 ("The right of amendment is denied only when the court can see
that it is impossible for the cause of action to be perfected, or ... when it appears
affirmatively that there is not, and cannot be, a cause of action.").
1 N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-25 (1943) ("If an action is commenced within the time
prescribed therefore, and the plaintiff is nonsuited, or a judgment therein reversed
on appeal, or is arrested, the plaintiff . . . may commence a new action within
one year. .. ").
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are in conflict with the rule of the principal case. The effect of this
statute is to extend the limitation period an extra year for any action
which is nonsuited, reversed, or arrested,16 and it has been applied to
conditions annexed to the cause of action as well as to ordinary Statutes
of Limitation.' 7 Under this section the court has allowed a new action
after a demurrer ore tenus had been sustained in the first action for
failure to state facts constituting a cause of action.' 8
In Blades v. Southern R. R.19 the court extended this tatute beyond
any rigid requirement of form in holding that a new action for wrong-
ful death brought eighteen months after plaintiff's intestate died could
relate back to a prior cross-complaint which had been dismissed as not
germane to the action in which it was filed.
In Woodcock v. Bostic2O the complaint failed to state a cause of
action and the "Saving Statute" was applied to allow a "new action"
after the Statute of Limitations had run. Since the section would have
been no protection against the Statute of Limitation if a new cause of
action had been alleged, the court expressly held that bringing a new
action after a failure to state a cause of action was not the statement of
a new cause of action. In 1828 Justice Ruffin said of the section, "The
plaintiff, therefore, shall be heard, until he can get a trial on the merits,
provided he has been diligent enough in the first instance to sue before
time barred him."2' 1
The principal case will serve to curtail seriously the valuable right
to amend pleadings, and will allow such amendments to relate back to
the original pleading only where it would have been good against a
demurrer in the first place. The plaintiff is thus required to stand or
fall on his first pleading if the Statute of Limitations has run, and such
was not the contemplation of our liberal amendment statute.22 A remedy
could be found either in the adoption of the Federal Rule,23 or in the
application of the "notice test"2 4 to our rule of relation back.
EDWARD B. HIpp.
1 Meekins v. Norfolk & S. R. R., 131 N. C. 1, 42 S. E. 333 (1902).1TIbid.
11Webb v. Hicks, 125 N. C. 201, 34 S. E. 395 (1899).9 218 N. C. 702, 12 S. E. 2d 553 (1940).
20 128 N. C. 243, 38 S. E. 881 (1901) (the "new action" was in fact an amend-
ment to the first complaint, and was allowed to spare the delay and expense of a
new action).
4 Morrison v. Connelly, 13 N. C. 233, 239 (1828). See Note, 40 Co. L. REv.
1440 (1940) criticizing a West Virginia case which refused to apply the Saving
Statute to a wrongful death action because the limitation was a condition prece-
dent. The principal case also accents the substantive nature of the limitation, but
expressly indicates that the same rule on relation back would apply to ordinary
Statutes of Limitation.
2 N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-163 (1943). "The judge may . . . amend any plead-
ing ... by inserting other allegations material to the case."
See note 4 supra.
,See note 7 supra.
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